Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects

DOI10.3390/G8030030zbMath1410.91370OpenAlexW2738306966MaRDI QIDQ1656953

Kateřina Staňková, Frank Thuijsman, Katharina Schüller

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030030

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlgame theorycooperationpollutionimitationStackelberg gameNash game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

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• The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements
• Pollution control: A differential game approach
• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• Consensus and Cooperation in Networked Multi-Agent Systems

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