A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction

DOI10.3390/g8030033zbMath1410.91162OpenAlexW2742838118MaRDI QIDQ1656958

Andreas Tutić, Sascha Grehl

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030033

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsbackward inductioniterative thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• hroot

Cites Work

• On the persistence of strategic sophistication
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
• The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
• Playing the wrong game: an experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation
• An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
• What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game

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