Contribution-based grouping under noise

DOI10.3390/G8040050zbMath1410.91027OpenAlexW2770633173MaRDI QIDQ1656989

Stefano Duca, Ryan O. Murphy, Dirk Helbing, Heinrich H. Nax

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040050

zbMATH Keywords

noiseefficiencybehavioral economicsheterogeneityvoluntary contributionswelfaremechanism designequality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Welfare economics (91B15)

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