Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2018.02.006zbMath1401.91592OpenAlexW2734445089MaRDI QIDQ1657309

Takashi Shibata, Michi Nishihara

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/62185

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsadverse selectionbankruptcysignaling gameaccounting qualityM\&A

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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