The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
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Publication:1662102
DOI10.1016/j.disopt.2013.10.003zbMath1506.91049OpenAlexW2569303878WikidataQ59864911 ScholiaQ59864911MaRDI QIDQ1662102
Daniel Binkele-Raible, Jörg Rothe, Gábor Erdélyi, Nicholas Mattei, Henning Fernau, Judy Goldsmith
Publication date: 17 August 2018
Published in: Discrete Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disopt.2013.10.003
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (8)
Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ How hard is safe bribery? ⋮ Weighted partial order oriented three-way decisions under score-based common voting rules ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information ⋮ Local distance constrained bribery in voting ⋮ Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery ⋮ Frugal bribery in voting
Uses Software
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