Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2015.06.005zbMath1410.91046OpenAlexW823755433MaRDI QIDQ1664280

Alexander S. Poznyak, Julio B. Clempner

Publication date: 24 August 2018

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryMarkov chainsstrong Nash equilibriumPareto-optimal Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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