Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.08.035zbMath1405.91037OpenAlexW2509795570WikidataQ38825291 ScholiaQ38825291MaRDI QIDQ1664438

Hisashi Ohtsuki, Nobuyuki Takahashi, Misato Inaba

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.035

zbMATH Keywords

altruismreputationsocial dilemmaindirect reciprocityexclusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Large group size promotes the evolution of cooperation in the mutual-aid game ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Voting with your feet: payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Competitive helping increases with the size of biological markets and invades defection
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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