Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation
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Publication:1664438
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.08.035zbMath1405.91037OpenAlexW2509795570WikidataQ38825291 ScholiaQ38825291MaRDI QIDQ1664438
Hisashi Ohtsuki, Nobuyuki Takahashi, Misato Inaba
Publication date: 27 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.035
Related Items (2)
Large group size promotes the evolution of cooperation in the mutual-aid game ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas
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