Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction

DOI10.1155/2015/301734zbMath1394.91163OpenAlexW2115981008WikidataQ59117922 ScholiaQ59117922MaRDI QIDQ1665287

Xiaohu Han, Shu-Lin Liu

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/301734

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction

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