The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.003zbMath1408.90179OpenAlexW1991242438MaRDI QIDQ1667178

Nelson A. Uhan

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycooperative gamescost sharing mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the core of network synthesis games
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
• A cost-sharing method for an economic lot-sizing game
• Structure preserving reductions among convex optimization problems
• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Cost-sharing mechanisms for network design
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced Games
• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
• On the core of linear production games
• Cost allocation for a spanning tree
• On the Core of Cost Allocation Games Defined on Location Problems
• Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
• The equal split-off set for cooperative games
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

This page was built for publication: The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games