On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.010zbMath1408.91015OpenAlexW2044595888MaRDI QIDQ1667200

Bertrand Tchantcho, Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

corevotinggroup decisionscommittee gamesone-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index

Cites Work

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• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• On Committee Decision Making: A Game Theoretical Approach
• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments

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