Revenue in contests with many participants

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.12.008zbMath1408.91089OpenAlexW1978950872MaRDI QIDQ1667201

Yizhaq Minchuk, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 27 August 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionall-pay auctioncontestrevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal crowdsourcing contests ⋮ Reverse contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Contest architecture
• Optimal Auction Design

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