Shareholder information and partial tender offers

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.08.033zbMath1398.91650OpenAlexW1415713950MaRDI QIDQ1667881

Elif Dalkır

Publication date: 31 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.08.033

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationpartial tender offerswinners' curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• On the optimality of partial tender offers
• Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers
• Information in Tender Offers With a Large Shareholder

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