Threshold voting leads to type-revelation

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.003zbMath1396.91135OpenAlexW2177772880MaRDI QIDQ1667910

Matías Núñez

Publication date: 31 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingstrategy proofnesscardinal utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Bargaining through approval
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• The Basic Approval Voting Game
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
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