An experimental study of voting with costly delay

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.12.019zbMath1396.91131OpenAlexW3121260765MaRDI QIDQ1668140

Michael Vlassopoulos, Helia Marreiros, Maksymilian Kwiek

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/385515/1/EL_Resubmission.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingwar of attritionsupermajorityintensity of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties

Cites Work

• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Storable votes
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions

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