On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010zbMath1396.91208OpenAlexW2279597718MaRDI QIDQ1668145

Stefan Terstiege

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/3884a826-792c-496d-b3a1-0a0e9483f714

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionpricinginformation disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites Work

• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination