Multilateral externalities: contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.01.020zbMath1395.91349OpenAlexW2298073171WikidataQ59211956 ScholiaQ59211956MaRDI QIDQ1668154

Franz Wirl, Carsten Helm

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020

zbMATH Keywords

contractsprincipal-agentbusiness as usualdifference due to allocation of private informationout-of-contractpermit market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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