Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.019zbMath1396.91229OpenAlexW2261495559MaRDI QIDQ1668157

Mustafa Çelebi Pinar, Halil Ibrahim Bayrak

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36848

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingimplementationsubmodular functionsonline advertisingoptimal auction designsecond price auction with reserve

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (1)

Robust bilateral trade with discrete types

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimization and mechanism design
• Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

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