A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.01.016zbMath1395.91259OpenAlexW3125450336MaRDI QIDQ1668158

Achim Wambach, Wanda Mimra

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-353062

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationreactive equilibriumcompetitive insurance marketcontract addition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (3)

A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
• Informational Equilibrium

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