Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.014zbMath1396.91557OpenAlexW2287444157MaRDI QIDQ1668177

Umutcan Salman, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.014

zbMATH Keywords

welfareBoston mechanismminorityaffirmative actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case ⋮ Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based ⋮ Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case ⋮ Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice

Cites Work

• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
• Effective affirmative action in school choice

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