Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.012zbMath1396.91237OpenAlexW2286795403MaRDI QIDQ1668178

Jürgen Eichberger, Dmitri Vinogradov

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16153/1/1-s2.0-S0165176516300337-main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyselling mechanismunmatched bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Special issue on ambiguity and strategic interactions in honor of Jürgen Eichberger ⋮ Price reveal auctions ⋮ Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions

Cites Work

• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions

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