Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.03.003zbMath1396.91269OpenAlexW2295199316MaRDI QIDQ1668227

Alex Possajennikov, Alexander Matros

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/78715/1/FinalAccepted_EconLett_Mar16.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscontestscommon value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design

Cites Work

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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