A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.006zbMath1396.91573OpenAlexW2342031859MaRDI QIDQ1668260

Yasunori Okumura

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

matchingpolynomial-time algorithmmarket designschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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