Does regret matter in first-price auctions?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.021zbMath1396.91277OpenAlexW2339530877MaRDI QIDQ1668262

Anmol Ratan, Yuanji Wen

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.021

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityauctionoverbiddinglaboratory experimentsanticipated regret

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison

Cites Work

• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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