Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015zbMath1396.91283OpenAlexW2335796237MaRDI QIDQ1668265

Caio Waisman

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametric identificationdiscriminatory auctionsempirical auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions

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