Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.017zbMath1398.91066OpenAlexW2343536971MaRDI QIDQ1668267

Daniel Monte

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentreputationone-sided monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

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