Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
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Publication:1668267
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.017zbMath1398.91066OpenAlexW2343536971MaRDI QIDQ1668267
Publication date: 3 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017
Cites Work
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- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
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