Many-to-one matchings without substitutability

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.005zbMath1396.91566OpenAlexW2310203730WikidataQ57431411 ScholiaQ57431411MaRDI QIDQ1668291

Devrim Ikizler, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymany-to-one matchingsubstitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• College applications and the effect of affirmative action
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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