Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.014zbMath1396.91117OpenAlexW2471432627WikidataQ109042820 ScholiaQ109042820MaRDI QIDQ1668496

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.014

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsimplementationmechanism designbank runpreference for honesty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• On run-preventing contract design
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Implementation with evidence

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