Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.016zbMath1396.91577OpenAlexW2469170405MaRDI QIDQ1668513

Benjamín Tello

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.016

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcontractscouplesbilateral substitutabilityweak substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples ⋮ Rationalizable choice functions

Cites Work

• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

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