How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.10.041zbMath1396.91125OpenAlexW2548471677MaRDI QIDQ1668658

Peng Zhang

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.041

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingpublic informationlarge Poisson gamespartisan voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Cites Work

• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Large Poisson games
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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