Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight

DOI10.1007/S10955-018-2012-2zbMath1416.91100OpenAlexW2789834314WikidataQ130124098 ScholiaQ130124098MaRDI QIDQ1668980

Michael D. Vose, Logan Perry, Sergey Gavrilets, Mahendra Duwal Shrestha

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Statistical Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10955-018-2012-2

zbMATH Keywords

modelingcooperationconflicttheory of mindcultural group selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (1)

Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game. Theory and experimental evidence
• Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
• How much does it help to know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study
• Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence
• Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Quantal Response Equilibrium
• Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games

This page was built for publication: Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight