A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.002zbMath1416.91141OpenAlexW2106983167WikidataQ129578323 ScholiaQ129578323MaRDI QIDQ1669102

Jesse A. Schwartz, Quan Wen

Publication date: 30 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15860

zbMATH Keywords

cost sharingdominant strategy implementationVickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: An axiomatic comparison
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
• Destroy to save
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
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