Indeterminacy and history dependence of strategically interacting players

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.006zbMath1396.91387OpenAlexW2366636561WikidataQ59211960 ScholiaQ59211960MaRDI QIDQ1670147

Franz Wirl

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitydifferential gamehistory and expectation dependenceKrugman's labor market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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