The negotiators who knew too much: transaction costs and incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.009zbMath1398.91050OpenAlexW3123724670WikidataQ56136543 ScholiaQ56136543MaRDI QIDQ1670149

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

transaction costsbargainingincomplete informationproperty rightsjoint ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points^*
• Unnamed Item

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