Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.024zbMath1396.91439OpenAlexW3123200587MaRDI QIDQ1670185

Magdalena Helfrich, Fabian Herweg

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5786.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

duopolycollusionthird-degree price discriminationgrim-trigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model

Cites Work

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