On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.029zbMath1394.91308OpenAlexW3123754660WikidataQ59709777 ScholiaQ59709777MaRDI QIDQ1670206

Jun Zhang

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/70372/

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymany-to-one matchingsubstitutabilityirrelevance of rejected contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts ⋮ Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts ⋮ Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Cites Work

• On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

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