Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.07.005zbMath1396.91450OpenAlexW2404119785MaRDI QIDQ1670221

Rupayan Pal, Marcella Scrimitore

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2016-010.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmarket concentrationnetwork effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities ⋮ Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition ⋮ Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach

Cites Work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Coordination and information in critical mass games: An experimental study
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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