Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
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Publication:1670693
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.043zbMath1405.91041OpenAlexW1994836788WikidataQ47329578 ScholiaQ47329578MaRDI QIDQ1670693
André Berchtold, Marco Tomassini, Enea Pestelacci, Jorge Peña
Publication date: 6 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.043
evolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationnon-uniform interaction ratesparticipation costsupstream reciprocity
Related Items (2)
The evolution of generalized reciprocity in social interaction networks ⋮ Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
Cites Work
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