Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2018.03.056zbMath1397.91469OpenAlexW2798204647MaRDI QIDQ1671327

Dinko Dimitrov, Yongjie Yang, Laura Kasper

Publication date: 6 September 2018

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.03.056

zbMATH Keywords

stable marriage problemstable matchingtwo-sided matchingpaths to stabilitygender consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• Paths to marriage stability
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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