The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.08.038zbMath1396.91240OpenAlexW2507853202MaRDI QIDQ1672595

Jingfeng Lu, Xin Feng

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.038

zbMATH Keywords

contestsinformation disclosureBayesian persuasionstochastic entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (9)

Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests ⋮ The perils of friendly oversight ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry ⋮ A model of parallel contests ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

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