Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.09.025zbMath1396.91275OpenAlexW2523892785MaRDI QIDQ1672733

Alberto Palermo

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingadverse selectionhold-up

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bargaining over incentive contracts
• Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information
• Contract design and bargaining power

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