Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003zbMath1398.91023OpenAlexW2555342601MaRDI QIDQ1672762

Vladislav Damjanovic

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/20240/1/20240.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

regret matchingtraveler's dilemma gameadaptive heuristicscoarse-correlated equilibriumminimal effort coordination game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Regret matching with finite memory
• Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
• The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Potential games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• An experimental study of costly coordination
• Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Adaptive Heuristics
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• A general class of adaptive strategies

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