Incompatibility between stability and consistency

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.11.022zbMath1396.91556OpenAlexW2550873507WikidataQ57428950 ScholiaQ57428950MaRDI QIDQ1672771

Umut Mert Dur, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconsistencymarket designincompatibilityschool choicematching theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?]

Cites Work

• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• A market to implement the core
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?]
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Multilateral Bargaining
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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