New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.12.009zbMath1398.91030OpenAlexW3122071368MaRDI QIDQ1672864

Takuma Wakayama, Hideki Mizukami

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

school choicedeferred acceptance algorithmNash implementationdominant strategy implementationsecure implementationrestricted monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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