A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.006zbMath1395.91026OpenAlexW2570464606MaRDI QIDQ1672866

Liang Mao, Tian-Yu Zhang

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumstrategic bargainingminimal sufficient setnormalized procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bargaining without commitment
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
• Multilateral Bargaining
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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