A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.020zbMath1395.91232OpenAlexW2583084428MaRDI QIDQ1672879

Jesse A. Schwartz, Timothy Mathews

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.020

zbMATH Keywords

\(k\)-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

\(k\)th price auctions and Catalan numbers

Cites Work

• \(k\)-price auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
• A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information
• Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions

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