Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.027zbMath1396.91137OpenAlexW2585662624MaRDI QIDQ1672882

Ali Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01416727

zbMATH Keywords

simple majority rulequalified majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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