Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022zbMath1396.91402OpenAlexW3124166705MaRDI QIDQ1672900

Anthony Lee Zhang, Piotr Dworczak

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemmechanism designWalrasian equilibriumimplementabilityefficient matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

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