Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
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Publication:1672901
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.026zbMath1398.91070OpenAlexW2584636688MaRDI QIDQ1672901
Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Volker Benndorf
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.026
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