Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.026zbMath1398.91070OpenAlexW2584636688MaRDI QIDQ1672901

Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Volker Benndorf

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.026

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryhawk-dove gameexperiment in continuous timeperturbed best response dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable? ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time

Cites Work

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• Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Quantal Response Equilibrium
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

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