General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2013.03.004zbMath1402.91060OpenAlexW1981904321MaRDI QIDQ1672996

Takuya Sekiguchi

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2013.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationmutation-selection balanceupdating rulestochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations ⋮ Fixation probabilities of strategies for trimatrix games and their applications to triadic conflict ⋮ Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games ⋮ Abundance of strategies for trimatrix games in finite populations ⋮ Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
• Evolutionary games on star graphs under various updating rules
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Enhanced cooperation in prisoner's dilemma with aspiration
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
• Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher

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