A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012zbMath1395.91242OpenAlexW2597441563MaRDI QIDQ1673442

Yu Zhou

Publication date: 12 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

zbMATH Keywords

price controlsmulti-item auctioncore allocationbudget constraintsrationed equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
• How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
• A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• The assignment game. I: The core